Epstein Secrets

'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible."' Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges' holding— legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—do

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible."' Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges' holding— legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—do

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

'cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses against children as possible."' Id. at 60 (quoting Schneider, 801 F.3d at 196 (quoting United States v. Dodge, 597 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc))). The primary basis for Bridges' holding— legislative history supporting a narrow interpretation—do

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury