Epstein Secrets

-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States I Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileged. Nor does the general p

ction with prosecution by one sovereign do not carry over to prosecution by another sovereign. In Cobb , the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McNeil. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutio

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

formation by conceding that he in fact has the documents.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 18, 2003, 383 F.3d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit has recently refused to extend the act of production doctrine on facts very similar to those here. In United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313 (D.C. Ci

dress rehearser if a party were allowed to feint and weave at the initial hearing, and save its knockout punch for the second round.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). Four, in any event, far from being a knockout punch, Epstein’s argument is meritless. As is readily app

01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileged. Nor does the general p

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

lear and sensible boundary' that is marked by the formal initiation of criminal proceedings and that Chief Judge Srinivasan astutely recognized for the D.C. Circuit in Fokker Services. There is a world of difference between a court insinuating itself into a prosecutor's case before charges are filed and steppin

540 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2008) (en bane). That right attaches, for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment, when "a prosecution is commenced."? a McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, III S. Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). In other words, a criminal defendant is entitled to counsel "at or

91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileged. Nor does the general

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim