Epstein Secrets

37 Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein Page 32 parties are implicated. See specified requests. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, at fn. 10 (1972): In Stanley, 394 U.S., at 564, 89 S.Ct., at 1247, the Court stated:'(A)lso fundamental is

rights to assert their constitutional right of privacy as guaranteed under the United States and Florida Constitutions. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra at 454-455 (The right encompasses privacy in one's sexual matters and is not limited to the marital relationship.). Ill. Conclusion Under

a particularized inquiry, evaluating whether the privilege applies with respect to each specific area that the questioning party wishes to explore. Melchor Moreno. 536 F.2d at 1049. The witness may be totally excused from testifying only if the court finds that he could legitimately refuse to answer essential

in the exception of §39.204. D. Third Party Privacy Rights Are Not a Basis to Deny Discovery The right to privacy discussed in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972), has nothing to do with the discovery issues in this case. Eisenstadt concerns the distribution of a contraceptive devic

”, and “only as to genuinely threatening questions should [the witness’s] silence be sustained.” Goodwin, 625 F.2d at 701 (quoting United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049 (5th Cir. 1976)). Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff’s interrogatories requesting that he identify employees may lea

37 Jane Doe No. 2 v. Epstein Page 32 parties are implicated. See specified requests. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, at fn. 10 (1972): In Stanley 394 U.S., at 564, 89 S.Ct., at 1247, the Court stated:'(A)Iso fundamental is

a particularized inquiry, evaluating whether the privilege applies with respect to each specific area that the questioning party wishes to explore. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d at 1049. The witness may be totally excused from testifying only if the court finds that he could legitimately refuse to answer essential