Epstein Secrets

the Israeli-Palestinian issue still offers a greater possibility for a consequential role. But that depends almost entirely on whether Israel and the Palestinian Authority come to own their negotiations and really want to get something done. That America's report card looks pretty good doesn't mean we should be happy

ed, it would give the U.S. leverage to pursue "tough love" with other American allies, EFTA_R1_00441184 EFTA01964436 including Hosni Mubarak and the House of Saud, to push for reforms in their countries. The 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit was also, in theory, supposed to lay the foundations for massive new effor

overreach as contributing to Sunni radicalism, unity, and pushback. For instance, they see the recent entry of Hamas into a unity government with the Palestinian Authority as the loss of a strong, radical, but Sunni regional ally. And it doesn't stop there. As Saeed Leylaz, an Iranian analyst cited by the Journal, re

Yemen war on one side, and they can't let Jordan fall. This is a heavy burden, even for them. Iran, say the hawks, can win a war of attrition with the House of Saud. Elsewhere, while Hezbollah may be having problems, and ISIS is ugly, Iran's hawks reason that the best way to help their friends and hurt their e

l chance asking: Do Israel's politicians even know who the Palestinians they are trying to make peace with are? Is it the negotiating delegation of the Palestinian Authority? Or do the Israelis look beyond the negotiation room? I do not doubt for a moment that Israeli politicians and their advisers and analysts know ver

fundamentalist groups in the region to overthrow the Saudi royal family in the 1980s. (The Saudi government is essentially a joint venture between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi establishment, lubricated by vast amounts of Danegeld paid to the propagation of Wahhabi fundamentalist views around the Muslim wor