Epstein Secrets

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

.,' Jane Doe No. 2 refused to be interviewed by the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office unless she was granted immunity. Ex. A, Sept. 21, 2006 Ltr. from Eisenberg to AUSA Villafafia; Ex. S, 6-12. Thus, she was unwilling to provide any information regarding her encounters with Epstein unless she was assured he

ners during the investigation of Epstein are highly relevant in determining whether each petitioner can even invoke the CVRA. Through her attorney, James Eisenberg, Esq.,' Jane Doe No. 2 refused to be interviewed by the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office unless she was granted immunity. Ex. A, Sept. 21, 2006 Ltr.

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

q.,' Jane Doe No. 2 refused to be interviewed by the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office unless she was granted immunity. Ex. A, Sept. 21, 2006 Is. from Eisenberg to AUSA Villafafia; Ex. S, ¶16-12. Thus, she was unwilling to provide any information regarding her encounters with Epstein unless she was assured h

ners during the investigation of Epstein are highly relevant in determining whether each petitioner can even invoke the CVRA. Through her attorney, James Eisenberg, Esq.,' Jane Doe No. 2 refused to be interviewed by the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office unless she was granted immunity. Ex. A, Sept. 21, 2006 Is. f

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "(T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that Irdothing in this chapter shall be construed to im

rvice of the subpoena, Ms.= retained the services of James Eisenberg, Esq. to represent her. Jeffrey Epstein paid for that representation. 3. Mr. Eisenberg communicated to me orally and in writing that Ms. would assert her Fifth Amendment privilege if she were forced to appear before the grand jury, an

force a federal prosecutor to seek an indictment where none has been sought, or to take back an agreement not to prosecute. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (the decision whether to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review," and "not readily

the investigation if the facts arc known or might attempt to escape if they have reason to believe certain indictments will issue. United States v. Eisenberg, 711 F.2d 959, 961 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958)). Several of the "facts" contained

e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996) (examining the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on racially- motivated charging); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding due process bars prosecution in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); Kolender v. Lawso

lack Jacket): A Critique on the Lack of Prosecution of Hunting "Accidents," 56.S.C. L. Rev. 135, 166-73 (2004). © See id.; Duane, supra note 48. 5! Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 893-96 (discussing data from prosecutor interviews). In the contexts Eisenberg describes, prosecutors typically forgo hate-crime o