r unless based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Id. These principles were reiterated in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), a case involving the government’s policy of prosecuting only those individuals who reported themselves as ha

icy of prosecuting only those individuals who reported themselves as having failed to register with the Selective Service system. The petitioner in Wayte claimed that the self-reported non-registrants were “vocal” opponents of the registration program who were being punished for the exercise of their

ervices B. Y., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C.Cir. 2016), quoting Newman v United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C.Cir. 1967). As the Supreme Court noted in Wayte, "[j]udicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the crim

nce value, the Government's 42 EFTA00299062 enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan..." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). As such, the decision to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Id. "Few subjects ar

Courts tread lightly where prosecutorial discretion is concerned because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 203, 203 n.648 (2006). "Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's ge

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States I. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that In]othing in this chapter shall be construed to im

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

ts are [not] competent to undertake" the kind of analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an a

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "(T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that Irdothing in this chapter shall be construed to im

Courts tread lightly where prosecutorial discretion is concerned because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 203, 203 n.648 (2006). "Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's g

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that "[n]othing in t

e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1996) (examining the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on racially- motivated charging); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding due process bars prosecution in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); Kolender v. Lawso

made an inexplicably poor decision when it decided not to prosecute Epstein. "[T]he Government retains `broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The CVRA incorporates this principle, providing that InJothing in this chapter shall be construed to imp

is constitutional responsibility to `take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'" United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. Untied States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely on

force a federal prosecutor to seek an indictment where none has been sought, or to take back an agreement not to prosecute. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (the decision whether to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review," and "not readily

k, 630 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing procedure for forfeiture). "[T]he Government retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute." Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quotation omitted). The CVRA expressly does not impair that broad discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o

his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely on

6) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985) (the decision whether to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited to judicial review," and "not readily

his constitutional responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely on

al responsibility to `take Care that the EFTA00208520 Laws be faithfully executed.'" United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Wayte v. United States , 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); quoting U.S. Const., Art. II § 3; citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547). This broad discretion rests largely o

ment's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985); see also Fokker, 818 F.3d at 737-738 (noting the long-settled understandings about the independence o