Epstein Secrets

274, 282 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 5, 11 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) 248 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003

create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement." Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term "United States." See

8) 152 United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 65 United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) 21, 26 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 76, 79, 80, 82 United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) 266, 268, 269 Unite

ndant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be "necessary but not sufficient" to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. The defendant's motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by t

274, 282 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 5, 11 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) 248 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 2003

create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement." Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term "United States." See

8) 152 United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 65 United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) 21, 26 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 76, 79, 80, 82 United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) 266, 268, 269 Unite

ndant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be "necessary but not sufficient" to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. The defendant's motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by t

182, 190 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 4, 9 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) 163 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 4, 5, 161 xix EFTA00095086 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 104 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.

create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement." Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term "United States." See

8) 105 United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 45 United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) 18, 21 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 52, 53, 54, 55 United States v. Mahabub, 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) 174, 176, 177 United S

ndant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be "necessary but not sufficient" to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 53 EFTA00095145 U.S. at 790. The defendant's motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the

274, 282 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 5, 11 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) 248 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 200

create an affirmative appearance that the agreement contemplated barring districts other than the particular district entering into the agreement." Salameh, 152 F.3d at 120 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This rule also extends to plea agreements that use the term "United States." See

) 152 United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 65 United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) 21, 26 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 76, 79, 80, 82 United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (MN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) 266, 268, 269 Unite

ndant could establish any actual prejudice—which she cannot—such prejudice would be "necessary but not sufficient" to establish a due process claim. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. The defendant's motion fails because she has not demonstrated the other necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by t

74, 282 United States v. Russo, 801 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1986) 5, 1 I United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007) 248 United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998) 5, 6, 245 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 151 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir. 200

8) 152 United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 65 United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1991) 21, 26 United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) 76, 79, 80, 82 United States v. Mahabub, No. 13 Cr. 908 (AJN), 2014 WL 4243657 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2014) 266, 268, 269 Unit

er necessary element to prevail: that the claimed delay by the Government was intentional and deliberate to gain a strategic advantage. Here, as in Lovasco, any pre-indictment delay was the result of the Government's continuing investigation of the case. The Lovasco Court held that the investigative de

a single conspiracy can contain multiple objectives, particularly if the objectives share important similarities, as they do here. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 148 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. 4/Irani, 968 F.2d 1512, 1518 (2d Cir. 1992)). Overlap of participants. The participants i

t have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 317; see, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 785-86, 788-90 (1977) (reversing dismissal for pit-indictment delay where a material defense witness had died); United States v. Sny