Epstein Secrets

rael-Lebanon war, when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad castigated his fellow Arab leaders as "half-men"

"half-men" for their failure to support Hezbollah. Another more recent example of Saudi willingness to play in Syrian politics was the welcome that Bashar's uncle, Rifaat, received in Riyadh when coming to pay his respects last month after Nayef's death. Rifaat has lived in Paris since 1984, having tr

gh Abdullah is often depicted as a Syriaphile, the monarch changed his attitude, especially after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad castigated his fellow Arab leaders as "half-men" for their failure to support Hezbollah. Another more recent example of Saudi willingness to play i

is appointment is a reflection of King Abdullah's concerns about developments in the Middle East, particularly Syria, and the limited talent pool in the House of Saud to meet the challenges. Frankly, it suggests panic in Riyadh. Where does one start? Bandar certainly used to be a firm pair of hands, but recently t

stance itself to some extent from Washington. In some areas, notably in calls for the international community to offer substantive aid to the anti- Assad opposition in Syria, the Morsi government found itself in partial agreement with U.S. policy preferences. However, there were also troubling signs

this point, a prolonged stalemate is the only outcome that would not be damaging to American interests. Indeed, it would be disastrous if President Bashar al-Assad's regime were to emerge victorious after fully suppressing the EFTA_R1_00441201 EFTA01964453 rebellion and restoring its control over the entire c

ed, it would give the U.S. leverage to pursue "tough love" with other American allies, EFTA_R1_00441184 EFTA01964436 including Hosni Mubarak and the House of Saud, to push for reforms in their countries. The 2004 G-8 Sea Island Summit was also, in theory, supposed to lay the foundations for massive new effor

bate is taking place in the Iranian establishment over whether its regional policies—backing Shi'a and Shi'a-friendly forces like Hezbollah and the Assad and Maliki governments to the hilt in brutal civil wars-is working. According to The Wall Street Journal, Iranian doves are pointing to the recent

Bye, Bye, Sykes-Picot." In other words, they are out to bring down not only the Syrian and Iraqi regimes but also the Arab system itself. President Bashar Al-Assad had said, in an interview with a Lebanese paper two weeks ago, that Damascus has received messages from Western governments lately. The Saudi roy

Yemen war on one side, and they can't let Jordan fall. This is a heavy burden, even for them. Iran, say the hawks, can win a war of attrition with the House of Saud. Elsewhere, while Hezbollah may be having problems, and ISIS is ugly, Iran's hawks reason that the best way to help their friends and hurt their e

e moral bankruptcy of its foreign policy, has reaped a harvest of consistency and single-mindedness. It has entirely and unwaveringly supported the Bashar Al-Assad regime, used its status as a permanent United Nations Security Council member to veto any opposing resolution, and has provided superior weaponry t

onal feebleness in response to the Iranian nuclear program. But the takeaway message on Syria is that in all of the circumstances, awful though the Assads were and disreputable and unacceptably motivated though their Iranian and Russian sponsors are, it is not clear that an objectively preferable alte

fundamentalist groups in the region to overthrow the Saudi royal family in the 1980s. (The Saudi government is essentially a joint venture between the House of Saud and the Wahhabi establishment, lubricated by vast amounts of Danegeld paid to the propagation of Wahhabi fundamentalist views around the Muslim wor