Epstein Secrets

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which

an attorney does not render everything he does for or with the client privileged." Gutter v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. , 1998 WL 2017926, *1 (S.D. Fl. May 18, 1998) EFTA00211785 (citations omitted). If an attorney (or his agent) was doing something other than rendering legal advice, neither the

l 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine. Moulton , 474 U.S. 159 — both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

s an attorney does not render everything he does for or with the client privileged." Gutter I E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. , 1998 WL 2017926, *1 (S.D. Fl. May 18, 1998) EFTA00223001 (citations omitted). If an attorney (or his agent) was doing something other than rendering legal advice, neither the

l's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually related' to a charged offense. Several of these courts have interpreted Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) and Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 —both of which were decided well before McNeil — to support this view, which res

nited States in evaluating that claim, but Epstein has objected to the production of those documents. -17- EFTA00179116 Co., 1998 WL 2017926, *1 (S.D. Fl. May 18, 1998) (citations omitted). If an attorney (or his agent) was doing something other than rendering legal advice, neither the attorney-client