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he government that Gonzalez approached him on another occasion for assistance in getting dis- missed a DWI for Jeff Lewis. Castaneda was unsure if Weaver had ultimately been successful in fixing the case. FN7. Castaneda told the government that an individual known as "Chuy" Hinojosa Page 4 of 11 P
xchange for getting the charges dismissed or sentences re- duced. Castaneda's role in this conspiracy was that of middleman, referring "clients" to Weaver, arran- ging meetings, receiving payments, and suggesting strategics for accomplishing fixes. Weavers role on the other hand was that of principal,
he transaction in- volving Jeff Lewis). Predicate Act Six-- referring to the dismissal of a marijuana charge for Silverio Garza-- pertained only to Weaver. FN I6. On appeal, Castaneda asserts four distinct errors that allegedly warrant the re- versal of his conviction. Because we con- clude that the g
he Agreement Acted in Good Faith [I] A party who materially breaches a cooperation or plea agreement may not claim its benefits. United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 508 U.S. 961, 113 S.Ct. 2933, 124 1,.Ed.2d 683 (1993); United Slates v. Tilley. 964 F.2d 66, 70 (1st
hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part
ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa
ed at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here--the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v, Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate s
hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part
ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa
ed at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here--the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v, Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate s
hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part
ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa
ed at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here--the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v, Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate s
hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part
ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa
ed at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here--the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v, Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate s
hment for crimes committed before its enactment `more onerous' than the punishment would have been under the unamended statute. Id. at 442 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36). Those penalties are the direct consequence of a defendant's commission of a predicate criminal offense and form a deliberate part
ight have led him to preserve exculpatory evidence." 539 U.S. at 611 (quoting Falter v United States, 23 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) and Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28). More important, the Court observed, California's revival of otherwise barred claims fell squarely within a category of ex post fa
ed at least $50,000 in damages. Id. (emphasis added). Where the statute's words are unambiguous—as the are here--the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v, Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted)). Under the 2003 version of the statute, only minors could initiate s
l observed in his opinion for **1498 the Comt in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d
erms of [the] provision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.
observed in his opinion for **1498 the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d
the are here-the "judicial inquiry is complete." Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th C
nition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). U.S. v. Siegel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998). In improperly attempting to
at language, and '[c]ourts have no authority to alter statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. EFTA00222831 Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13 E
ition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime." 14/rice v. Mathis 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting Weaver v. Graham 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). U.S. v. Sieuel,153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998). In improperly attempting to
at language, and '[c]ourts have no authority to alter statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187.° See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.Ct. 2478 (2005); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124. EFTA00175293 • Case 9:09-cv-80469-KAM Document 13
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