Epstein Secrets

reement [2] Leach argues that the government's advocacy for the § 4B1.5(a) enhancement breached the plea agreement. The government stipulated that Leach's base offense level was 24, but the enhancement, if applied, would have increased Leach's offense level to 34. Leach further contends that becaus

ommerce to attempt to persuade, induce, and entice a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In sentencing Leach, the district court declined to apply enhancements advocated by the government under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a) or, alternatively, under § 4B1.5(b). Leac

f- fense, which applies? United States, ev rel. Harris' Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (2nd Cir.I992), provides guidance on this issue. In Ex. rel. Harris, the Second Circuit was faced with a potential conflict between two senten- cing provisions, one which permitted " 'all sen- tences' of summary court-martial [to] be ca

ate." See United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491,494 (E.D. PA. 2001). The Request for Production Plaintiffs claim that the "act of production doctrine" does not encompass reque

timonial admissions and to be a witness against himself and to authenticate the existence of certain items. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993). For the same reasons set out above, the interrogatories seek compelled statements and further ask that Epstein authenticate and testify to t

lau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491,494 (E.D. PA. 2001). Moreover

nt. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenfh 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiffs overly broad request see

te." See United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491,494 (E.D. PA. 2001). Moreover, the act of production itself may implicitly communicate statements and, for this reason, the Fift

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

te." See United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491, 494 (E.D. PA. 2001). Add new case from my e-mail of yesterday: (Court in Englebrick v Worthington Industries Inc 670 F Supp2d 10

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

te." See United States v. Neff, 315 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950); SEC v Leach, 156 F.Supp.2d 491,494 (E.D. PA. 2001). Moreover, the act of production itself may implicitly communicate statements and, for this reason, the Fift

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the