Epstein Secrets

principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Whether to investigate po

very of admissible evidence and the defendants have not made any showing to the contrary, this justification for [discovery] must fail. Id.; accord Reist, 2010 WL 4940096 at '2 (recognizing the "chilling effect" that discovery can have on the willingness of parties to enter into settlement negotiation

his chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, the only real purpose in seeking the plea negotiatio

ery of admissible evidence and the defendants have not made any showing to the contrary, this justification for [discovery] must fail. Id.; accord Reist, 2010 WL 4940096 at *2 (recognizing the "chilling effect" that discovery can have on the willingness of parties to enter into settlement negotiation

principle that [title Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation s criminal laws. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. Const. art. II, K 3. Whether to investigate

very of admissible evidence and the defendants have not made any showing to the contrary, this justification for [discovery) must fail. Id.; accord Reist, 2010 WL 4940096 at '2 (recognizing the chilling effect that discovery can have on the willingness of parties to enter into settlement negotiations