Epstein Secrets

tive powers with respect to a deferred prosecution agreement and held, based on constitutional considerations regarding the powers conferred on the Executive, that the district court could not reject the deferred prosecution agreement in that case based on its disagreement with the Executive's charging de

the government and the defendant that are never filed with the court and do not result in the institution of criminal charges. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components, U.S. Att'ys re: Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Pros

wers with respect to a deferred prosecution agreement and held, based on constitutional considerations regarding the powers conferred solely on the Executive, that the district court could not reject the deferred prosecution agreement in that case based on its disagreement with the Executive's charging d

nd the defendant, are never filed with the federal court and by definition precede the institution of federal criminal charges. See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Department Components, U.S. Att'ys re: Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Pro

-Violence v. Pierce, 786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("The power to decide when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of the Executive's duty to see the faithful execution of the laws"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) ("[t]he decision of a prosecutor in the Executive B

4 The fact that Mr. Epstein's counsel sought to keep the NPA outside the public record was hardly unusual. The NPA is not a judicial document. See Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non—Prosecution Agreements with Corporations,