Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of t

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing