Epstein Secrets

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of t

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

prove that the defendant's sole purpose for traveling and transporting the individual was to have the individual engage in illegal sexual activity. Mortensen v. United States , 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944); Crespo v. United States , 151 F.2d 44, 46 (1st Cir. 1945). This offense carries a statutory maximum of