Epstein Secrets

uch usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http:

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

uch usurpation does not legitimize executive action that exceeds its bounds. See Tab 12, November 2, 1994 Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to the Hon. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel To The President, on Presidential Authority To Decline To Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, available at http:

olations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 2422(b) and 2423(b). Since the limited review conducted by CEOS, two Supreme Court decisions—one authored by Justice Scalia and the other by Justice Thomas—have revitalized the bedrock principles that federal criminal statutes must be narrowly construed, that they may not

ch a provision, can be a valid and reasonable exercise of Presidential authority." Memorandum for Bernard N. Nussbaum, Counsel to the President, from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel at 4 (Nov. 3, 1993). (Of course, the President is not obligated to announce his reservations in

issue agreed that the President has "the power to veto encroaching laws . . . or even to disregard them when they are unconstitutional." Id, at 906 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing existence of Pre