Epstein Secrets

only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even political, allegiance to the so-called Motherland (#4). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, diaspora Chinese have been called on to help achieve the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation—a summons that places growing pressure on eth

ent Xi Jinping, first at Mar-a-Lago and then at the Beijing summit, Congress took a wait-and-see posture. But as his own ardor for a partnership with Xi cooled and his administration became disenchanted with the idea of finding an easy new “engagement” policy, momentum began to shift. Soon Congress wa

ffice in 2017 and actively began courting Chinese President Xi Jinping, first at Mar-a-Lago and then at the Beij

Chinese Nation is a Dream shared by all Chinese” [emphasis added]. In January 2018, Politburo member and former state counselor and foreign minister Yang Jiechi made this presumption even clearer when he called upon the government to expand and strengthen “Overseas Chinese Patriotic Friendly Forces” in the se

censorship of views opposed by the Party and stressed the necessity of, in the words of one piece in 2015, “properly telling China’s story” (echoing Xi Jinping’s instructions). And Beijing’s efforts have had some successes. Ranked the number-five Chinese website in the United States, http://backchina.com wa

reatened or exercised Section 7 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020568 110 economic retaliation. For example, in June 2018, the Wall Street Journal reported that Xi warned a group of global CEOs that China would retaliate with “qualitative measures” targeted at their companies, if the United States did not back o

ce President Joe Biden met with then Chinese vice president Xi Jinping to discuss China’s quota on foreign films

, a vice minister of Foreign Affairs, is deputy director. Other members of the Commission include the most senior leaders of the Chinese government: Yang Jiechi, and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, State Security, Defense, Public Security, Commerce, the CCP’s International Liaison Department, Taiwan Affairs

ational policy establishment, because if there is to be any new directive concerning China’s place in the world, it’s likely to be found somewhere in Xi Jinping’s 3,000 character report to this conference. Of course, the entire deliberations of the conference are not made public. Three-and-a-half years ago, on

ay that all these suddenly began after the 2014 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. Some began in the two years before then after Xi first became General Secretary in late 2012. And some have their antecedents in the late Hu Jintao period. But my point is that they all either began

t there be any doubt on this count, the ranking foreign policy technocrat attending the Work Conference, former Foreign Minister and State Councillor Yang Jiechi, and now Director of the Foreign Policy Office of the Party Central Committee, refers explicitly to the ideological significance of this conference.