s applicability. See, e.g., United States v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Muiloz, 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 25

applicability. See, e.g., United States v. Schaltenbrand , 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. MuRoz , 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D.

one in confidence. "The burden of proving that a communication falls under the attorney-client privilege rests on the proponent of the privilege." Hawkins v. Stables , 148 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The party invoking the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that an attorney-

done in confidence. "The burden of proving that a communication falls under the attorney-client privilege rests on the proponent of the privilege." Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The party invoking the attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving that an attorney