hin the Executive Branch's prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, applying the dissent's interpretation of the CVRA would clearly interfere with the Executive Branch's investigative and prosecutorial functions. Having explored the consequences of the dissent's interpretation of the CVRA, it is clear that such an

laced its motivations in issue," (D.E. 416 at 47 n.9). The doctrine of separation of powers severely limits the judiciary's ability to oversee the Executive Branch's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. "Mudicial authority is ... at its most limited when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over char

laced its motivations in issue," (D.E. 416 at 47 n.9). The doctrine of separation of powers severely limits the judiciary's ability to oversee the Executive Branch's exercise of prosecutorial discretion. "Mudicial authority is ... at its most limited when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over char