er, in her First Amended Complaint (DE #38), Jane Doe does not seek an injunction nor does she assert a claim under Fla. Stat. §726.101 et seq. See Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So. 2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (holding that a party must ''file suit under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act" to enjoin frau

ction to prevent “transfer[ring] assets abroad” and distinguishing De Beers). In one final attempt to obscure this Court’s power, Epstein cites Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So.2d 1367, 1368 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993), as rejecting plaintiff’s motion to prohibit a defendant from transferring assets. Mem. in Opp.

failed to show unavailability of an adequate remedy at law and the likelihood of irreparable harm, two elements essential to entry of an injunction); Lawhon v. Mason, 611 So.2d 1367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (quashing trial court order requiring defendant to Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 400 Entered on FLS

leges the defendant may be dissipating assets; a judgment for money damages is adequate and injunctive relief is improper) (citations omitted). The Lawhon court also noted that the order was similar to a pit-judgment writ of attachment. 611 So. 2d at 1368. "A writ of attachment cannot issue unless the