Epstein Secrets

of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mil

of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

18 U.S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). When it comes to statutory construction, the mandatory nature of the word "shall" is well-settled. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory `shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi

not subject to a Court's discretion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congre

S.C. § 3509(k) (emphasis added). The word "shall" means that the statute's command is mandatory and not subject to a Court's discretion. See, e.g., Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress' "use of a mandatory 'shall' to impose discretionless obligations") (emphasis added); Lexecon Inc. v. Mi