Epstein Secrets

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00020277 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00022107 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury

tions that a deceased witness might have provided favorable testimony do not justify dismissing an indictment for delay. See, e.g., United States v. Scala, 388 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Court agrees with this approach. Maxwell 17 EFTA00029556 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:20-cr-003

truthful answer might reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 753-54 (2d Cir. 1994). Like knowing falsity, materiality is an element of the offense and thus ordinarily must be "decided by the jury