Epstein Secrets

for our insights. It was 253 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011724 because we were people with whom Rabin felt comfortable — a counterpoint, I suspect, to the old Labor Party rival whom he had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, no

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders’ relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

ce in Jerusalem. Then, we shifted venue, meeting at a Mossad-owned villa north of Tel Aviv. I brought along Bougie Herzog, a bright young lawyer, and Labor Party member, who was working in the same law firm and Ne’eman. It was by no means clear we’d agree on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogeth

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

ary action was necessary. 419 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011890 / BARAK / 134 Yet the delay in getting to that point had serious implications for my role as Labor Party leader. Since the negotiations with the Palestinians were stuck in neutral, I was under increasing pressure from within Labor to pull out of Bibi’s g

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

for our insights. It was 253 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028101 because we were people with whom Rabin felt comfortable - a counterpoint, I suspect, to the old Labor Party rival whom he had made Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres. Though the two men had grown to respect each another over the years, Rabin neither trusted, no

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders' relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

ce in Jerusalem. Then, we shifted venue, meeting at a Mossad-owned villa north of Tel Aviv. I brought along Bougie Herzog, a bright young lawyer, and Labor Party member, who was working in the same law firm and Ne'eman. It was by no means clear we'd agree on a unity government. To my amusement, if not altogeth

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

itary action was necessary. 419 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028267 / BARAK / 134 Yet the delay in getting to that point had serious implications for my role as Labor Party leader. Since the negotiations with the Palestinians were stuck in neutral, I was under increasing pressure from within Labor to pull out of Bibi's g

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the