Epstein Secrets

ing back to Shalah's visit to Qatar, Al-Monitor learned that the Islamic Jihad leader met Emir Tamim and his influential adviser and former Israeli Knesset member, Azmi Bishara, who is working on launching a new media network that includes a London-based TV operation, newspaper and a Beirut-based websi

strong ally of Iran," he added. "Putting Palestine at the head of the list of priorities can help in bridging the gaps. That's why today Hamas and Islamic Jihad are playing an important role in political reconciliation within the bloc — today in Tehran and tomorrow maybe in Damascus." Getting back to Shalah

assume a responsibility that has become "part of Germany's reason of state," as Chancellor Merkel said in a speech to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, in March 2008? "It means that for me, as a German chancellor, Israel's security is never negotiable," Merkel told the lawmakers. The perils of suc

t's the only kind of outpost of the Iranian influence in the Arab world ... and it will weaken dramatically both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza." The rebellion in Syria has now lasted more than a year. The opposition is not going away, and it is abundantly clear that neither diploma

he pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he’d win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben-Gurion in his political heyday. From 1948, Israel’s political landscape had been populated by at least a doz

n groups grounded not in nationalism, but fundamentalist Islam: Hamas in Gaza, which opposed Israel’s presence on any part of “Muslim Palestine,” and Islamic Jihad on the West Bank. And in Lebanon, we were confronting the Iranian-backed Shi’ ite militia fighters of Hizbollah. Each of us in the small group on wh

quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet if it was going to bring the peace process to a halt. I warned Bibi, both in the Knesset and in a series of speeches, about the alternative on the Palestinian side if those who wanted a negotiated peace had nothing but stalemate to show f

w if we could, however difficult or reluctant Arafat was as a negotiating partner. If we waited, we’d end up having to deal with Islamists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Oded Eran, the career diplomat whom I'd put in charge of frustrating, formal talks with the Palestinians in the months preceding the summit , said h

he pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect he'd win an outright majority in the 120-seat Knesset. No one had ever done that, not even Ben-Gurion in his political heyday. From 1948, Israel's political landscape had been populated by at least a doz

n groups grounded not in nationalism, but fundamentalist Islam: Hamas in Gaza, which opposed Israel's presence on any part of "Muslim Palestine," and Islamic Jihad on the West Bank. And in Lebanon, we were confronting the Iranian-backed Shi'ite militia fighters of Hizbollah. Each of us in the small group on whom

quitting. He said it would be a waste of time to stay in the cabinet if it was going to bring the peace process to a halt. I warned Bibi, both in the Knesset and in a series of speeches, about the alternative on the Palestinian side if those who wanted a negotiated peace had nothing but stalemate to show f

w if we could, however difficult or reluctant Arafat was as a negotiating partner. If we waited, we'd end up having to deal with Islamists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Oded Eran, the career diplomat whom I'd put in charge of frustrating, formal talks with the Palestinians in the months preceding the summit, said he

ease-Fires (18 January 2009) 410 Gaza War II: Cease-Fire Agreement (21 November 2012) 416 Part II. Peace Proposals and Ideas Prime Minister Begin’s Knesset Speech on Home Rule (28 December 1977) 419 Fahd Plan (7 August 1981) 422 Reagan Plan (1 September 1982) 423 Fez Peace Initiative (9 September 1982) 4

tcomes of the London Conference on Palestinian Reform (17 January 2003) 1205 Fatah Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1209 Hamas and Islamic Jihad Declaration of Cease-Fire Initiative (29 June 2003) 1211 Israeli Cabinet Communiqué Approving the Removal of Arafat (11 September 2003) 1213 Hamas