Epstein Secrets

0719574 the appeal of internationalizing the conflict mean there are few political incentives for flexibility toward Israel. Divisions between the Fatah and Hamas factions complicate matters: Their recent agreement is paper-thin and highlights that, for now, Palestinians are focused more on immediat

nited States, to direct military actions, even when they entail enormous risks. And obviously, the bin Laden operation is the most dramatic, but al- Qaeda was on its [knees] well before we took out bin Laden because of our activities and my direction. In Afghanistan, we've made very tough EFTA00719570

Muwafi had also been Egypt's main interlocutor with the Palestinians. He had been working in recent months to broker a unity pact between Hamas and Fatah. Muwafi understood that Egypt had much more leverage over Hamas after the extremist group had been forced to flee its base in Syria; working with t

actor with an agenda independent of the mainstream Syrian opposition, given the growing reports of the emergence on the battlefield of various al- Qaeda affiliated jihadist groups. Syria's borders with Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq have become increasingly porous — Sunni insurgents and jihadists once en

od. Sooner or later, the plan cou=d be revived, coupled with an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Vall=y to minimize risks of a Gazan repeat. Fatah and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority have a long-term object=ve that differs markedly from Israel's: a state enjoying full sovereign =ights

nited States, to direct military actions, even when they ent=il enormous risks. And obviously, the bin Laden operation is the most dramatic, but al- Qaeda was on its [kne=s] well before we took out bin Laden because of our activities and my dire=tion. In Afghanistan, we've made very tough decisions bec

aker than they've been in a long time.=President Obama's relationship with Netanyahu, to put it mildly, is not wa=m, and the continued split between Fatah and Hamas complicates matters fur=her. The administration has also publicly signaled a "pivot to Asia", a declaration that foreign =olicy prioritie

th of Iran's involvement in the fig=ting. It is entirely conceivable, in other words, that a post-Assad regime in Syria would be explicitly pro=96a1 Qaeda or even more openly pro-Iran. Either result would be unacceptab=e to Israel. Of course, an extended civil wa= in Syria does not serve Israel's inte

of Israel. To many in Hamas, Mashaal sounded as if he was diverting to a dangerous course in an effort to adjust to the Arab Spring, handing their Fatah rivals an easy victory. A chorus of protests by the Gaza leaders — not to mention by the West Bankers — immediately erupted. Mashaal was accused o

f the successor regime to the Assads. The opposition forces have been endorsed not just by the US, but also by al- EFTA_R1_00230060 EFTA01842755 Qaeda, which must be a first. Remembering that western weapons once supplied the precursors to the Taliban in Afghanistan, the west should be extremely

s already stepped over the wreckage of the U.S.-Israeli effort to smash Hamas and brokered a unity agreement between the movement and Abbas' rival Fatah party, although its implementation remains bedeviled by deep rivalries and internal splits in Hamas over its terms. And nobody ought to be too sur

out of Syria. Particular attention should be paid to preventing them from being transferred to Hezbollah and Iran or falling into the hands of al- Qaeda. Washington should also develop contingency plans with these countries and the Syrian opposition to prepare a disaster response plan for the possib

s for accountability, for representation, and for respect of their basic human rights by both the government dominated by Hamas in Gaza and that of Fatah in the West Bank. This is also the time to expose and push for an end to PA security collaboration with the occupying Israeli forces. EFTA00584919

erers. It aspires to change global history again by provoking more conflict to set the stage for its new caliphate. The strategy is insane, but Al- Qaeda is determined to pursue it. The 9/11 attacks cost about a half-million dollars to organize and execute, according to the U.S. 9/11 Commission repor