Epstein Secrets

yed, they may succeed by the end of June. The plan is for that new government to rule for six months and then hold elections, but neither Hamas nor Fatah wants to subject itself to the unpredictability of the polls. For Abbas, elections might end his years of happy globe-trotting. He claims that ret

esident Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—most associated with extreme views of how to han

of the first four years. During the 2004 campaign, Bush came close to jettisoning the two people—Vice-President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—most associated with extreme views of how to handle post-9/11 foreign affairs. After the election, Cheney saw the influence of his principal ideolo

tinians. While Israel continued with its settlement policy, the mediation efforts of the US administration were going nowhere. The bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas had failed and tensions were high between Hamas and Cairo. Then, suddenly, Egypt closed a reconciliation agreement between the Palestinia

meted out to the Republicans in the congressional elections of 2006, his appointment was taken as a sharp break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the new taciturn man at the Department of Defense had no place in it for the spread of democracy in Arab

break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the n

tinians. While Israel continued with its settlement policy, the mediation efforts of the US administration were going nowhere. The bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas had failed and tensions were high between Hamas and Cairo. Then, suddenly, Egypt closed a reconciliation agreement between the Palestinia

meted out to the Republicans in the congressional elections of 2006, his appointment was taken as a sharp break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the new taciturn man at the Department of Defense had no place in it for the spread of democracy in Arab

break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the n

tinians. While Israel continued with its settlement policy, the mediation efforts of the US administration were going nowhere. The bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas had failed and tensions were high between Hamas and Cairo. Then, suddenly, Egypt closed a reconciliation agreement between the Palestinia

meted out to the Republicans in the congressional elections of 2006, his appointment was taken as a sharp break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the new taciturn man at the Department of Defense had no place in it for the spread of democracy in Arab

break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the n

ement. At a time when Arab leaders everywhere are under attack for being remote, corrupt and elitist, it is simply too risky for the leadership of Fatah, the Palestinian faction in control of the West Bank, to enter into tortuous negotiations with the Israelis that will inevitably lead to accusation

g infantries and saturation bombing, and apparently capable of regenerating itself at minimal expense. From the perspective of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his White House cronies, this would not do. Since the US was accustomed to fighting other nation-states — geopolitical entities containing such

such identifiable targets as capital cities, airports, military bases, and munitions plants — we would have to find a nation-state to fight, or as Rumsfeld put it, a "target-rich environment". Iraq, pumped up by alleged stockpiles of "weapons of mass destruction" became the designated surrogate for an

ement. At a time when Arab leaders everywhere are under attack for being remote, corrupt and elitist, it is simply too risky for the leadership of Fatah, the Palestinian faction in control of the West Bank, to enter into tortuous negotiations with the Israelis that will inevitably lead to accusation

g infantries and saturation bombing, and apparently capable of regenerating itself at minimal expense. From the perspective of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his White House cronies, this would not do. Since the US was accustomed to fighting other nation-states — geopolitical entities containing such

such identifiable targets as capital cities, airports, military bases, and munitions plants — we would have to find a nation-state to fight, or as Rumsfeld put it, a "target-rich environment". Iraq, pumped up by alleged stockpiles of "weapons of mass destruction" became the designated surrogate for an

tinians. While Israel continued with its settlement policy, the mediation efforts of the US administration were going nowhere. The bid to reconcile Fatah and Hamas had failed and tensions were high between Hamas and Cairo. Then, suddenly, Egypt closed a reconciliation agreement between the Palestinia

meted out to the Republicans in the congressional elections of 2006, his appointment was taken as a sharp break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the new taciturn man at the Department of Defense had no place in it for the spread of democracy in Arab

break with the legacy of his predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. It was an open secret that the outlook of the n

mer than ever, and the looser tunnel patrols in Egypt mean greater access to weapons as well. But opinion surveys show that its more secular rival, Fatah, is more popular. That may explain why an attempt at political unity with Fatah is moving slowly: the Hamas leaders here are likely to lose their

estoring morale at the Pentagon and, more important, repairing relations with Congress, which had grown distrustful of the Defense Department under Rumsfeld. Bridging two administrations, Gates gets credit for stabilizing Iraq, though the key decisions that led to success--a surge of troops and the app

irmer than ever, and the looser tunnel patrols in Egypt mean greater access to weapons as well. But opinion surveys show that its more secular rival, Fatah, is more popular. That may explain why an attempt at political unity with Fatah is moving slowly: the Hamas leaders here are likely to lose their job

restoring morale at the Pentagon and, more important, repairing relations with Congress, which had grown distrustful of the Defense Department under Rumsfeld. Bridging two administrations, Gates gets credit for stabilizing Iraq, though the key decisions that led to success--a surge of troops and the appoin