Epstein Secrets

hel Bronson Article 5. The Guardian China crackdown: A tweak of the tiger's tail Isabel Hilton Article 6. Politico Iran: U.S. losing allies in Mid East Michael Adler EFTA_R1_02013862 EFTA02687045 2 Article 1. Washington Post Arab democracy and the return of the Mediterranean world Robert D.

a 10 percent economic growth rate, Turkey is also a demographic and economic juggernaut that can project soft power throughout the Mediterranean. The Middle East's march away from authoritarianism will ironically inhibit the projection of American power. Because of the complexity of hybrid regimes, American in

m the dust of tyrannies legitimate political orders. It is less democracy than the crisis of central authority that will dominate the next phase of Middle Eastern history. Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a correspondent for the Atlantic. EFTA_R1_02013865 EFT

rivacy of their homes. In the public space, there was now the cult of the rulers, the unbounded power of Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The traditional restraints on power had been swept away, and no new social contract between ruler

n in Saudi Arabia? Rachel Bronson The Guardian China crackdown: A tweak of the tiger's tail Isabel Hilton Politico Iran: U.S. losing allies in Mid East Michael Adler EFTA00586525 Washington Post Arab democracy and the return of the Mediterranean world Robert D. Kaplan February 27, 2011 -- Wit

a 10 percent economic growth rate, Turkey is also a demographic and economic juggernaut that can project soft power throughout the Mediterranean. The Middle East's march away from authoritarianism will ironically inhibit the projection of American power. Because of the complexity of hybrid regimes, American in

m the dust of tyrannies legitimate political orders. It is less democracy than the crisis of central authority that will dominate the next phase of Middle Eastern history. Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a correspondent for the Atlantic. EFTA00586528 AniCIC

privacy of their homes. In the public space, there was now the cult of the rulers, the unbounded power of Saddam Hussein and Muammar el-Qaddafi and Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. The traditional restraints on power had been swept away, and no new social contract between ruler

a act on its commitment to support NATO's missile defense project by placing radars on its territory. Turkey, anchored in NATO and oriented toward the Middle East, is a greater threat to Iranian interests than the merely pro- EFTA_R1_00229098 EFTA01842297 Western Turkey of a decade ago. There is a chance tha

s to put down the rebellion there against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad is the remake of a really bad movie that starred Bashar's father, Hafez, exactly 30 years ago this month. I know. I saw the original. It was April 1982 and I had just arrived in Beirut as a reporter for The New York Ti

February in the Syrian town of Hama, led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Word had it (there were no Internet or cellphones) that then-President Hafez al-Assad had quashed the rebellion by shelling whole Hama neighborhoods, then dynamiting buildings, some with residents still inside. That May, I got a visa

yahu said. "It's an Iranian- backed terror organization committed to Israel's destruction." On Sunday he told his cabinet that for Israel, living in the Middle East required self-sufficiency and toughness. "In such a region," he said, "the only thing that ensures our existence, security and prosperity is our st

ti- Semitism. It has also combined its continuing alliance with the West with a growing tone of independence, making the former more respectable in Middle Eastern eyes. This has made the AKP a "model," or at least a source of inspiration, for more progressive Arab Islamist parties that have emerged victoriou

ly wrong: Assad's is an oppressive, minority-Alawi regime. It came to power via a 1970 coup. In 1982, the current dictator's father, then president Hafez al- Assad, brought artillery and killed over twenty thousand Islamist rebels in the town of Hama. The son is less efficient and likely to lose powe

Kremlin wouldn't block future Security Council resolutions on Syria. The Kremlin refused, but the details of the offer were leaked to the press by Middle Eastern and Western sources, and then subsequently denied by the Russian Foreign Ministry. It must have been the happiest denial the ministry has issued in

speaking at an international conference on this very topic held in Beirut, Lebanon, from Nov. 27-30. The conference was attended by 45 scholars of Middle Eastern and Kurdish studies from the United States, Europe and the Middle East. The consensus of the conferees was that the possibility of the emergence of

ians do." The Syrian-Russian relationship was always rather complicated, full of mutual suspicion and attempts by Moscow to impose an ideology that Hafez al-Assad didn't much care for, in exchange for military and intelligence assistance that Syria couldn't do without. But Damascus isn't just a resurrected st

power to civilians. As for human rights, though, just what do Egyptians have to celebrate? Not all that much — a sad commentary on the uprising in the Middle East's most populous country, one that is a reference point for regional politics despite its poverty and EFTA_R1_00234086 EFTA01845140 stagnation. Yes

insula and before it slipped out of the hands of the Arabs into those of the Persians and the Turks. Yet decades earlier, Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez -- a man of supreme cunning and political skill -- had ridden the military and the Baath Party to absolute power, creating a regime in which power

China, India, Pakistan, Israel and Nor=h Korea. More will likely emerge. The author presents detailed case studies on East Asia, South Asia and the =iddle East to bolster his argument that the multipolar nuclear world is al=eady changing the military strategies of regional powers in significant wa=s and to

ls against Mr. Assad's Al=wite sect and Syria's other religious minorities is growing every day. Following the rise to power of Mr. Assad's father, Hafez, in 1970, Alawit=s were transformed from a persecuted minority sect to the controlling forc= within the army and government. With a system of perks

tably begun to try to convert their financial power into political influence. They have launched an offensive against secular and/or Shia states in the Middle East. Their main target is Iran, which is growing stronger despite sanctions, and which can become even stronger in case of its nuclearization. These se

ing "led" by powerful members within his own family, and also his Russian backers. On the other, he pointed out that President Assad's late father, Hafez, had been equally ruthless during his rule, which EFTA00701861 included the massacre of more than 10,000 people during a Muslim Brotherhood upris

ng the conflict with our Arab enemies would almost certainly become more difficult with time. 9 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011480 Iraq, perhaps Iran and other Middle Eastern states, might get nuclear weapons. A violent form of fundamentalist Islam could, over time, erode existing Arab and Muslim states, threatening Israel

ed us. I knew the drill: the same thing had happened when I had come tantalizingly close to finalizing a peace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — ha

ng the conflict with our Arab enemies would almost certainly become more difficult with time. 9 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027857 Iraq, perhaps Iran and other Middle Eastern states, might get nuclear weapons. A violent form of fundamentalist Islam could, over time, erode existing Arab and Muslim states, threatening Israel

ed us. I knew the drill: the same thing had happened when I had come tantalizingly close to finalizing a peace deal with Syria’s then-dying dictator, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — ha