Epstein Secrets

incidents there, in order to annex the so- EFTA00718140 called "demilitarized zones". Still later, the memory of these incidents was used to annex the Golan Heights. The start of Lebanon War I was a direct violation of the cease-fire arranged a year earlier by American diplomats. The pretext was flimsy as usual

events so often, that it has by now acquired the status of fact. BACK TO the Oslo Criminals. I did not belong to them, though I visited Arafat in Tunis while the talks in Oslo were going on (unbeknownst to me), and talked with him about the whole range of possible compromises. EFTA00718141 May Ro

ht at last be ready for real, not just cold peace. Mr. Mubarak was not. Nor is Mr. Assad of Syria, who has refused every Israeli offer to hand back the Golan Heights. If you rule at the head of a tiny Alawite minority, why take the Heights and give away a conflict that keeps you in power? Peace at home— justice,

nsent—makes for peace abroad. Still, don't hold your breath. Yes, democracy is where history is going, but it is a long, perilous journey even from Tunis to Tripoli, let alone all the way to Tehran. Mr. Joffe is senior fellow at the Freeman-Spogli Institute for International Studies and a fellow at

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

ctober 1985. It came a couple of days after an especially gruesome Palestinian terror attack. Even with Arafat now more than a thousand miles away in Tunis, much of Rabin’s focus was taken up in responding to, or trying to preempt, Palestinian terrorism. The issue was especially sensitive politically in

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

ctober 1985. It came a couple of days after an especially gruesome Palestinian terror attack. Even with Arafat now more than a thousand miles away in Tunis, much of Rabin's focus was taken up in responding to, or trying to preempt, Palestinian terrorism. The issue was especially sensitive politically in

the Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and about 1,150 square kilometres of Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. 1 September 1967 Khartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. 21 March 1968 The battle of Karame

425 and 426 (Lebanon). Camp David Accords. Arab League Summit in Baghdad. Egypt suspended from the Organiza- tion. Its headquarters to be moved to Tunis. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023152 --- PAGE BREAK --- OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 12/9/2014, SPi Chronology xxi 10 December 1978 President Sadat and Prime

East environment shaped by Israel’s overwhelming victory over the Arabs in the 1967 war, its seizure of extensive Arab territories including Syria’s Golan Heights and its subsequent close alliance with the United States, which put in place a sort of dual US- Israeli regional hegemony from which Syria and its al

ndrews Air Force Base, and by midmorning she was in the Oval Office conferring with President Obama. The night before, as her plane was en route from Tunis, they had agreed that the vote of the United Nations Security Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya meant that it was now decision time on launchi