Epstein Secrets

ll seek assurances from Egypt not only about llamas stopping all fire out of Gaza but also about Egypt preventing the smuggling of arms through the Sinai into Gaza. Is Egypt up to or even willing to play this role? Much will depend on what matters most to Egypt's new leaders: their ideology or the c

t U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf and an intensifying U.S.-led economic warfare campaign slowed Iran down, but it was the decline of the al Assad regime that put Iran on the defensive. An emboldened Sunni opposition in Syria, backed by the West, Turkey and the Arab Gulf states, could spill in

but strategically secure in Israel wins. After Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem, Israelis knew there was no way morally that they could hold onto the Sinai and strategically they did not feel the need to any longer. The first intifada, which focused on stone- throwing, got Palestinians Oslo. The second

and Iran a dominant influence there, the Israelis face a more complex choice. If the regime of President Bashar al Assad survives (with or without al Assad himself), Iran -- which is supplying weapons and advisers to Syria -- will wield much greater influence in Syria. In effect, this would create an

the region. Last week's attack on the Eilat road should be understood in this context. Some are hypothesizing that new Islamist groups forming in the Sinai or Palestinian groups in Gaza operating outside Hamas' control carried out the attack. But while such organizations might formally be separate from H

olicy in Lebanon - wholly dependent on Iran. And Iran without its Syrian ally is very far away from Hezbollah. Like Tehran, Hezbollah thus also wants al Assad to survive. Hezbollah joining Hamas in a confrontation with Israel would take the focus off the al Assad regime and portray his opponents as undermin