Epstein Secrets

lamist regime in Damascus or, more likely, Lebanese-style instability cannot please the Israelis. They are already experiencing jihadist threats in Sinai. The idea of having similar problems in Syria, where the other side of the border is the Galilee rather than the Negev, must make them nervous. Bu

ns that abut it suggest a process of ethnic cleansing to prepare the way. An Alawite coastal ministate that folds in the port cities of Latakia and Tartus, home to the Russian navy's key warmwater port, may not be viable in the long run, but that doesn't mean the regime's core won't try for one. Even

fundamental change in Israel's strategic calculus. The loss of a faraway strategic partner and the gain of a EFTA00659893 new one just across the Sinai desert gave rise to a new doctrine, most clearly enunciated by Israel's second great strategic thinker, Yitzhak Rabin. A hawkish dove, Rabin believ

f the Assad regime would almost inevitably decrease Russian power in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Syria has hosted Russia's naval base in Tartus for several decades and, since 1971, Syria has been Moscow's closest Arab ally. Syria is the largest Arab purchaser of Russian weapons and is seen

urplus for export. A short-term hiccup in Israel's plans is the increasing vulnerability of gas imports from Egypt due to recurring sabotage of the Sinai pipeline. Its current domestic supplies -- obtained from the Mari-B field off Ashkelon -- will be depleted before the Tamar field starts productio

rivate "slush funds." Beyond that, Libya has also reportedly offered Russia a naval base in Benghazi while Syria has offered Moscow a naval base at Tartus. These events suggest that in return for arms sales host states are being pressured to give Moscow access to foreign bases. We have also seen this