Epstein Secrets

in all shapes and forms. Will the iconic image of the Arab uprisings be the patient queueing of Egyptian voters or, perhaps, the self-immolation of Tunisia's Mohammad Bouazizi? Or will it be something less heroic, like Gaddafi hounded like a rat out of his drainage pipe in Libya? Or something profoundl

all could advance its geopolitical interests. Explaining Israel's Reluctance Even if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would not take power in a post- Assad Syria, or even if it would not change Syrian foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine once empowered, Israel may have national interests in Assad stayin

ont runners for these positions are considered dovish on the =ssue. In the broader context of the region, unpredictability is the order of the =ay. Tunisia and Egypt seems to be roughly split in two with regimes leanin= to conservative Islam on one side and moderate, secular and liberals on t=e other. I

is leads to two questions: when Assad realises that he will fall, will he=then try to drag with him as many enemies as he can? And: what will a post=Assad Syria look like? An acute worry has risen from reliable intelligence reports that he has arm=d up to forty warheads of Scud missiles with a variety of ch

was uneasy with 2011's outpouring of people power from the start, lest it flow into the kingdom as well. First, when Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia, he and his family were welcomed in Saudi Arabia. Then, Riyadh worked EFTA_R1_02205167 EFTA02721247 to prevent the toppling of the Hosni Mubarak

Further, the influence of the Turkish Kurdish party on some Syrian Kurds is worrisome for Ankara. Moreover, the Saudi and Turkish visions for post- Assad Syria differ. Saudi Arabia advocates a Sunni Islamist regime and is establishing ties with the more radical elements in the country. Turkey, on the other