Epstein Secrets

show in the following days, with perfunctory manifestations to mark the reconciliation easily outdone by drive-by rallies of local Real Madrid and Barcelona football club supporters, then battling it out for the Spanish league title. Such lack of engagement reflected not only doubts about the viability

essful, it proffers doubtful leverage in his tug of war with Tel Aviv. Although Syria is an independent state, in 44 years it hasn't managed to pry the Golan Heights away from Israel; a Palestinian state is unlikely to do better with the 60 percent of the West Bank that remains under full Israeli control. Legall

1995. Although the Oslo peace process had dramatically changed things, it was clear that the real prize — real peace — was still far away. We were in Barcelona, for a Euro-Mediterranean meeting under the auspices of King Juan Carlos, aimed at trying to re-invigorate negotiations. The ceremonial centrepiece o

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Just a few weeks after the assassination, I represented Israel at a Euro- Mediterranean Partnership conference in Barcelona. Its only real diplomatic work consisted of ironing out the wording of the communique. The real value was in the corridors, and at the dinner held at

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin

1995. Although the Oslo peace process had dramatically changed things, it was clear that the real prize — real peace — was still far away. We were in Barcelona, for a Euro-Mediterranean meeting under the auspices of King Juan Carlos, aimed at trying to re-invigorate negotiations. The ceremonial centrepiece o

ldiers crossed the border on an intelligence mission. It had happened in 1954, and it ended in a failure even more serious than Rotem. The target was the Golan Heights, inside Syria. The special technology unit attached to military intelligence had developed a bugging device designed to be placed on a telephone pole

ution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Just a few weeks after the assassination, I represented Israel at a Euro- Mediterranean Partnership conference in Barcelona. Its only real diplomatic work consisted of ironing out the wording of the communique. The real value was in the corridors, and at the dinner held at

ade with him. The substance in any agreement, though politically difficult, was also more straightforward. We knew what Assad wanted: the recovery of the Golan Heights, in return for the absolute minimum level of political normalization with Israel. We knew what we wanted: security guarantees and assurances regardin