Epstein Secrets

a magnet for extremist groups complicates the ending of the bloodshed and increase the odds of post Assad Syria ending up as a failing state, a new Lebanon at best or somalia at worst. >>> Secondly, the possibility of much wider use of chemical weapons grows with every round of actual use, as the psych

a cultural norm and the conflict already became a magnet for extremist groups complicates the ending of the bloodshed and increase the odds of post Assad Syria ending up as a failing state, a new Lebanon at best or somalia at worst. >>> Secondly, the possibility of much wider use of chemical weapons grows

ary superpower. The Arab Spring is demolishing the capabilities of Iran's key ally, Syria. Hezbollah is in danger of losing its Syrian backers, and Lebanon is in danger of slipping into another civil war exported from Damascus, which would keep Hezbollah preoccupied. The balance of power tilts decisive

all could advance its geopolitical interests. Explaining Israel's Reluctance Even if the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would not take power in a post- Assad Syria, or even if it would not change Syrian foreign policy vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine once empowered, Israel may have national interests in Assad stayin

ortance is being played out= On the one side there is a regional axis of allies going from Teheran throu=h Baghdad to Damascus and to Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the diplomatic pro=ection of Moscow and Beijing. On the other side there is a block of count=ies in full political and military confrontation

is leads to two questions: when Assad realises that he will fall, will he=then try to drag with him as many enemies as he can? And: what will a post=Assad Syria look like? An acute worry has risen from reliable intelligence reports that he has arm=d up to forty warheads of Scud missiles with a variety of ch

r in the region through soft balancing. Specifically, Ankara would undermine Tehran's influence in Palestinian politics and its dominance in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria by getting closer to those states itself. So, even as Ankara pursued better relations with Saudi Arabia, it continued to engage Iran, e

Further, the influence of the Turkish Kurdish party on some Syrian Kurds is worrisome for Ankara. Moreover, the Saudi and Turkish visions for post- Assad Syria differ. Saudi Arabia advocates a Sunni Islamist regime and is establishing ties with the more radical elements in the country. Turkey, on the other