Epstein Secrets

closer at hand: building institutions of a putative state, governing their people and lessening Israel's footprint. They are unlikely to agree with Jerusalem over the scope of its withdrawal, which almost certainly makes negotiations futile. For now, a unilateral Israeli decision could suit both sides. A

ing overtime to calculate how it should respond to possible scenarios on the horizon (the fall of the Assad regime, an attack on Iran, a revival of the Green Movement in Iran, an Iranian-Western nuclear agreement, and so on). Hamas and Syria are the most vulnerable members of the Resistance and Deterrence Front

nect whatever dots are available as they make judgments about the threats and opportunities. And the sad reality is that, viewed from Washington or Jerusalem, the upheavals of the last 18 months have transformed an already difficult regional landscape into perhaps the most inhospitable strategic environm

g in the potential for the sort of transformative change inside Iran that was stifled but, one hopes, not extinguished by the regime's crackdown on the Green Movement three years ago. As for Egypt -- still in the early days of its revolutionary moment, outsiders wield little sway over the direction of its turbule

and Europe are taking steps Ito prevent Iran f=om getting nuclear weapons] ... that's the way right now," he told Newsweek in a recent interview in Jerusalem. "=e don't have to monopolize it." &nb=p; 10 EFTA_R1_01448628 EFTA02406479 That Israel's two most senior political figures don't see eye t= eye

ing overtime to calculate how it should respond to possible scenari=s on the horizon (the fall of the Assad regime, an attack on Iran, a revival of the Green Movement in Iran, an Ira=ian-Western nuclear agreement, and so on). Hamas and Syria are=the most vulnerable members of the Resistance and Deterrence Front th