Epstein Secrets

t been growing closer to each other for several years, with small gestures of mutual accommodation. Israel agreed to return the Sergei courtyard in Jerusalem to Russia in 2008, a small strip of land in a religiously and ethnically divided city that had been sold in 1964 for a load of oranges. It then hal

i al-Maliki's spokesman told the BBC were suspicions of "corruption." The Russian press has tried to lay blame for this on U.S. pressure exerted on Maliki during his visit to Washington last October, his first ever since winning the premiership in 2006. (He had had already traveled twice to Moscow in

gress during its two years in office, mostly because the White House insisted on a 100 percent construction freeze in the West Bank settlements and Jerusalem as a precondition for negotiations. This was politically impossible in Israel, and also meant that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas could not co

nder the auspices of the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council. In Iraq, the Saudi government will continue to pursue a hard-line stance against the Maliki government, which it regards as little more than an Iranian puppet. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia will act to check the growth of Hezbollah and to ensur

s and Israel. That doesn't mean they'll EFTA_R1_02047570 EFTA02695893 13 be warmongers, or that they'll refuse to work with Washington, or even Jerusalem, on areas of common interest. Islamism has been on the rise throughout the Arab and Islamic world for nearly a century and will probably set the po

Status of Forces agreement had to be approved by the Iraqi Parliament, according to American legal experts. And no Iraqi politician, certainly not Maliki, seemed willing to stake his political future on supporting legal immunity for American soldiers. Of course, even after a full withdrawal, the Unit

those strikes were focused solely on the destruction of weapons depot=, and that Israel has given no indication of wanting to intervene any furt=er. Jerusalem, ultimately, has little interest in actively hastening the f=ll of Bashar al-Assad. Israel knows one important thin= about the Assads: for the past

ity, has been a boon t= the Sunnis of Iraq. The Sunnis have bottomless grievances against the gov=rnment of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. To them, Maliki, who spent a qua=ter-century exiled in Syria and Iran, is an agent of the Iranian theocracy. So even though the regime in S=ria did its best to sub

o. How Washington, which has repeatedly and more or less publicly vetoed the idea, would react to an Israeli strike deeply worries policymakers in Jerusalem. But it worries them far less than a nuclear-weaponized Iran. And besides, some Israeli officials believe that in an election year, President Obama

e been supporting opposing camps. Since Iraq's first democratic elections in 2005, Iran has supported the Shiite-backed Dawa party of Nun Kamal al- Maliki, while Turkey has backed the secular pan-Iraqi movement of Ayad Allawi. Following months of contention after the 2010 elections, Maliki formed a go

s nuclear sites, or can be persuaded to delay that decision and rely on the United States instead. This is what a parade of U.S. officials visiting Jerusalem this summer have counseled (and pressured) Israel to do. But the comments of Israel's top officials suggest that its patience is wearing thin and t

sects. The Shiite Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad officially attended the summit. The Saudi King invited eight sects to the dialogue: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I, Hanbali (i.e. the four Sunni schools) and the Shiite al-Jaafari, al-Zaidi, al-Abazi and al-Zahiri sects, which exist in the Gulf region,

s nuclear sites, or can be persuaded to delay that decision and rely on the United States instead. This is what a parade of U.S. officials visiting Jerusalem this summer have counseled (and pressured) Israel to do. But the comments of Israel's top officials suggest that its patience is wearing thin and

ects. The Shiite Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad officially attended the summit. The Saudi King invited eight sects to the dialogue: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I, Hanbali (i.e. the four Sunni schools) and the Shiite al-Jaafari, al-Zaidi, al-Abazi and al-Zahiri sects, which exist in the Gulf region,

rogress during its two years in office, mostly because the White House insisted on a 100 percent construction freeze in the West Bank settlements and Jerusalem as a precondition for negotiations. This was politically impossible in Israel, and also meant that Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas could not come

under the auspices of the six-country Gulf Cooperation Council. In Iraq, the Saudi government will continue to pursue a hard-line stance against the Maliki government, which it regards as little more than an Iranian puppet. In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia will act to check the growth of Hezbollah and to ensure