Epstein Secrets

organization, but couldn't find a suitable one among the contenders. Perhaps they feared what the leading alternatives might do with regime power: Moussa perhaps rallying anti-Islamist forces and rolling back their gains, Abu Ismail capturing Islamist sympathies and votes and shunting the Brotherhood

ganization he dominates. Finally, his presence in the race could well galvanize the non-Islamist vote to rally behind a consensus candidate such as Amr Moussa. The third reason for surprise was the candidate himself. If the Brotherhood needed to field a candidate, then it could have turned to one of its w

he historian David Nichols put it, during a "perfect storm." Britain and France had invaded Egypt under the guise of bringing to a halt fighting in the Suez Canal between Egypt and Israel, and the Soviet Union had deemed this the right time to crush a Hungarian bid for freedom. Ours is a different world. Bara

lrahman al-Attiyah, former Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, as the new Secretary-General for the League of Arab States, to replace Amr Moussa. The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the GCC, held in Riyadh last weekend, has supposedly endorsed the Qatari nomination. It is worth noting th

of Minister al-Arabi came after two important decisions were taken by the new ruling Military Council: (1) it allowed two Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal on their way to Syria; and (2) it permitted Hamas officials to travel though Rafah's crossing, thus reversing President Mubarak's policy on this iss

two countries began to consider the resumption of direct flights between the two nations after 32 years. Also in 2010, the head of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, urged member countries to acknowledge the new geopolitical realities in the region: namely, the rise of non-Arab countries such as Turkey and Iran

n by peaceful relations -- or less tense relations -- with Iran." Just weeks after the downfall of Mubarak, Egypt allowed Iranian warships to cross the Suez Canal, provoking uproar among Israelis and even Americans. In succeeding months, the diplomatic flirtation between the two countries took an even more i

e some of the other Arab foreign 282 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011753 ministers when we’d arrived in the banqueting hall. I did have a good talk with Egypt’s Amr Moussa, and the foreign ministers of Morocco and Tunisia. When I tried to start a conversation with Syria’s Farouk al-Sharaa, however, he pointedly, though

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major ris

e some of the other Arab foreign 282 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028130 ministers when we'd arrived in the banqueting hall. I did have a good talk with Egypt's Amr Moussa, and the foreign ministers of Morocco and Tunisia. When I tried to start a conversation with Syria's Farouk al-Sharaa, however, he pointedly, though

the alternative scenario: that Sadat might strike with more limited territorial objectives and, under cover of his SAM batteries on the other side of the Suez Canal, advance into the Sinai. In the Lebanon war, the inquiry suggested, Yehoshua Saguy did try to warn the generals, and the government, about major risk