Epstein Secrets

Ori Or, a friend even before we’d both gone into the army, and who had now joined Labor. The other two were leading members of Likud: Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, Menachem Begin’s son. All three said they were sure the allegations were false. Did they know the details about the accident, they were asked. No, t

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders’ relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

ted, there wouldn’t be a run-off. At the start of April, the final list of candidates was set. There were five. In addition to Bibi, Yitzhik and me, Benny Begin had decided to run on the right. Also in the contest was Knesset member Azmi Beshara, the first Israeli Arab citizen to seek national office. When w

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

s took place within the so-called Group of Eight, often also including the chief of staff and other top generals from the kirva. Both Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, Menachem Begin’s son and a minister without portfolio, were opposed to an Israeli attack from the start. They were convinced that the implications f

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

Ori Or, a friend even before we'd both gone into the army, and who had now joined Labor. The other two were leading members of Likud: Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, Menachem Begin's son. All three said they were sure the allegations were false. Did they know the details about the accident, they were asked. No, t

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders' relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

there wouldn't be a run-off. * ** At the start of April, the final list of candidates was set. There were five. In addition to Bibi, Yitzhik and me, Benny Begin had decided to run on the right. Also in the contest was Knesset member Azmi Beshara, the first Israeli Arab citizen to seek national office. When we

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

s took place within the so-called Group of Eight, often also including the chief of staff and other top generals from the kirya. Both Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, Menachem Begin's son and a minister without portfolio, were opposed to an Israeli attack from the start. They were convinced that the implications f

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the