Epstein Secrets

e first flight out through London. But before we left, Nava phoned again, almost sputtering in fury. She told me that she’d just received a call from Aliza Goren, Rabin’s media spokesperson. “Does Ehud know about the Yediot story?” she’d asked. When Nava said yes, Aliza told her: “It is important that Ehud kno

our position was that, assuming all our own negotiating concerns were addressed, we accepted that peace with Syria would include withdrawing from the Golan. The formula was agreed in a meeting in Israel between Rabin and the Clinton Administration’s Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross. Rabin didn’t tell

or the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem Yitzhak had faced over the Americans’ misuse of our “pocket deposit” on the Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord. But h

y that engulfed me before joining Rabin’s government, had undeniable experience and ability which I valued and respected: Yitzhak’s former media aide Aliza Goren. As campaign coordinator, I chose Tal Silberstein, who at the time was in charge of a citizens’ group called Dor Shalem Doresh Shalom: “A Whole Gener

Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned: a deal might be possible, but only if Israel was willing to commit in advance to pulling out of the Golan. Assad told Lauder to come back to him with a detailed map setting out Bibi’s view on delineating the Israeli-Syrian border under a peace agreement.

outbursts, and they won’t do you any good.” He challenged Bibi to just “look me in the eye” and admit what he really thought about the future of the Golan. The media verdict was unanimous. Mordechai had won. Which meant I had won. Though my American and British brains’ trust had little input into our d

e first flight out through London. But before we left, Nava phoned again, almost sputtering in fury. She told me that she'd just received a call from Aliza Goren, Rabin's media spokesperson. "Does Ehud know about the Yediot story?" she'd asked. When Nava said yes, Aliza told her: "It is important that Ehud kno

our position was that, assuming all our own negotiating concerns were addressed, we accepted that peace with Syria would include withdrawing from the Golan. The formula was agreed in a meeting in Israel between Rabin and the Clinton Administration's Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross. Rabin didn't tell

or the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem Yitzhak had faced over the Americans' misuse of our "pocket deposit" on the Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord But he

y that engulfed me before joining Rabin's government, had undeniable experience and ability which I valued and respected: Yitzhak's former media aide Aliza Goren. As campaign coordinator, I chose Tal Silberstein, who at the time was in charge of a citizens' group called Dor Shalem Doresh Shalom: "A Whole Gener

Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned: a deal might be possible, but only if Israel was willing to commit in advance to pulling out of the Golan. Assad told Lauder to come back to him with a detailed map setting out Bibi's view on delineating the Israeli-Syrian border under a peace agreement.

outbursts, and they won't do you any good." He challenged Bibi to just "look me in the eye" and admit what he really thought about the future of the Golan. The media verdict was unanimous. Mordechai had won. Which meant I had won. Though my American and British brains' trust had little input into our da