Epstein Secrets

enty years, when Netanyahu's Likud was out of power, Abbas conducted direct negotiations with Israeli leaders: first with Labor's Justice Minister, Yossi Beilin, in 1995, and then with centrist Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in 2008. Twice, Abbas endorsed principles of action on the core issues proposed by Isr

trived show of reciprocity that masks how negotiations are going nowhere. The most serious obstacle is Israeli and ideological. Most of Netanyahu's Likud, along with his ultra-rightist, Orthodox coalition partners, believe that Jerusalem and the whole land of Israel is the sacred EFTA00662853 patri

journalist Ron Pundak. Three PLO officials were there, led by Arafat’s closest economic aide, Abu Ala’a. Though both of the Israelis were friends of Yossi Beilin, a protégé of Peres and our deputy foreign minister, even Peres didn’t know about the meeting until Yossi told him the following day. Rabin knew an h

losing their jobs. Israel’s next election, the first since the Lebanon war, was due in July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud’s three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

he left. Right after Yitzhak’s murder, I’d gone to see Zevulun Hammer, the leader of the National Religious Party. It had been part of both Labor and Likud governments ever since 1948, though not Rabin’s. The NRP, too, had been drifting steadily rightward. But it still basically subscribed the idea of a

journalist Ron Pundak. Three PLO officials were there, led by Arafat's closest economic aide, Abu Ala'a. Though both of the Israelis were friends of Yossi Beilin, a protégé of Peres and our deputy foreign minister, even Peres didn't know about the meeting until Yossi told him the following day. Rabin knew an h

losing their jobs. Israel's next election, the first since the Lebanon war, was due in July. Just as the trauma of the 1973 war had helped Begin end Likud's three decades in opposition, the polls and the pundits were now suggesting that Shimon Peres might bring Labor back to power. There was no prospect

e city of Jerusalem. I was not opposed to the Palestinians calling Jerusalem the capital of their state. But even in follow-up talks after Oslo, when Yossi Beilin and Abu Mazen had explored avenues toward a possible resolution of the Jerusalem question, the maximum understanding was that Israel might expand the

he left. Right after Yitzhak's murder, I'd gone to see Zevulun Hammer, the leader of the National Religious Party. It had been part of both Labor and Likud governments ever since 1948, though not Rabin's. The NRP, too, had been drifting steadily rightward. But it still basically subscribed the idea of a

e referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2000 Camp David Statement. 28 September 2000 Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, prompting major Palestinian riots. Second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifadah) b

uent talks between the parties. In 1992, as the director of the Norwegian research institute Fafo, I initiated, together with then member of Knesset Yossi Beilin, secret talks between him and local Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini, at the American Colony Hotel in Jerusalem. These talks, which were facilitate