Epstein Secrets

212 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011683 Middle East Affairs, and four years later the United Nations envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte. “Why are you so strident,” Shamir asked me, only half-jokingly, after ’'d insisted on joining a government discussion and pressing several intelligence matters. “It’s because I’ve rea

our position was that, assuming all our own negotiating concerns were addressed, we accepted that peace with Syria would include withdrawing from the Golan. The formula was agreed in a meeting in Israel between Rabin and the Clinton Administration’s Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross. Rabin didn’t tell

or the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem Yitzhak had faced over the Americans’ misuse of our “pocket deposit” on the Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord. But h

her West Bank redeployments meandered ahead. We also discussed in detail how a unity government would work. We agreed it would be presented, like the Shamir-Peres partnership in 1984, as a cross- party response to an important challenge for the country: in this case, security and the peace process. I woul

Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned: a deal might be possible, but only if Israel was willing to commit in advance to pulling out of the Golan. Assad told Lauder to come back to him with a detailed map setting out Bibi’s view on delineating the Israeli-Syrian border under a peace agreement.

outbursts, and they won’t do you any good.” He challenged Bibi to just “look me in the eye” and admit what he really thought about the future of the Golan. The media verdict was unanimous. Mordechai had won. Which meant I had won. Though my American and British brains’ trust had little input into our d

r 212 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028060 Middle East Affairs, and four years later the United Nations envoy, Count Folke Bernadotte. "Why are you so strident," Shamir asked me, only half-jokingly, after I'd insisted on joining a government discussion and pressing several intelligence matters. "It's because I've rea

our position was that, assuming all our own negotiating concerns were addressed, we accepted that peace with Syria would include withdrawing from the Golan. The formula was agreed in a meeting in Israel between Rabin and the Clinton Administration's Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross. Rabin didn't tell

or the promise, or maybe only the hope, of peace. It was the same problem Yitzhak had faced over the Americans' misuse of our "pocket deposit" on the Golan. I realized that, having come this far with Oslo, neither he nor the government was likely to back away from approving the Gaza-Jericho accord But he

her West Bank redeployments meandered ahead. We also discussed in detail how a unity government would work. We agreed it would be presented, like the Shamir-Peres partnership in 1984, as a cross- party response to an important challenge for the country: in this case, security and the peace process. I woul

Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned: a deal might be possible, but only if Israel was willing to commit in advance to pulling out of the Golan. Assad told Lauder to come back to him with a detailed map setting out Bibi's view on delineating the Israeli-Syrian border under a peace agreement.

outbursts, and they won't do you any good." He challenged Bibi to just "look me in the eye" and admit what he really thought about the future of the Golan. The media verdict was unanimous. Mordechai had won. Which meant I had won. Though my American and British brains' trust had little input into our da