Epstein Secrets

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan’s Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011664 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundamen

m’s initial hopes and expectations for the unit had been more than met. Sayeret Matkal had played the key role in erasing the traumas of Uri Ilan and Rotem, and restoring the morale and effectiveness of Israeli military intelligence. Time and again, operations which we said we could do — dismissed as too

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011673 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

under a shadow, or been fired. Sometimes this was because of ultimately non-fatal lapses, like a botched mobilization of our reserves in 1959, or the Rotem crisis a few months later. Sometimes, it was due to lethal failures like the Yom Kippur War and Lebanon. I went to see all eight former directors wh

en brought in as the core of a peacekeeping force. But in the summer of 1981, new US President Ronald Reagan's Mideast envoy, Undersecretary of State Philip Habib, had 193 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028041 brokered a cease-fire to halt Palestinian Katyusha rocket fire into Israel. It was generally holding. But fundament

m's initial hopes and expectations for the unit had been more than met. Sayeret Matkal had played the key role in erasing the traumas of Uri Ilan and Rotem, and restoring the morale and effectiveness of Israeli military intelligence. Time and again, operations which we said we could do - dismissed as too

itical fortune, the mere prospect of Arik further expanding the 202 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028050 invasion had the effect of persuading Washington to send Philip Habib back into the diplomatic fray. With no early sign, however, of Arafat agreeing to leave, Arik now steadily tightened what amounted to a siege on west

under a shadow, or been fired. Sometimes this was because of ultimately non-fatal lapses, like a botched mobilization of our reserves in 1959, or the Rotem crisis a few months later. Sometimes, it was due to lethal failures like the Yom Kippur War and Lebanon. I went to see all eight former directors who