Epstein Secrets

peace. Peres's gentle demeanor contrasted with the implacable, bulldozer style of other members of the founding generation, from Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir to Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin. Peres sometimes seemed the bridesmaid at the Israeli political wedding, never quite achieving the status

wo attacks aimed at the group. On June 20, a suicide bomber detonated his payload at a checkpoint in Dahr al-Baidar, on the road between Beirut and Damascus, killing a 49-year-old Internal Security Forces officer and wounding 32 others, making it the first suicide bomb to hit Lebanon in twelve weeks. Th

re were nearly 100 missile sites in the “prohibited” zone, giving the Egyptians control of 20 miles or more of the airspace on our side of the canal. Golda was incensed. So was Bar-Lev. But there was no way, and no will, to reopen the fighting and force Nasser to move the missiles back. The cease-fire t

le undeniably risky, seemed to me to have every chance of success. It was to abduct a number of Syrians from an officers’ club on the western edge of Damascus. We would land in transport helicopters a few miles away and unload a pair of armored cars captured in 1967. But Raful’s view prevailed. I could not

ve the political experience in war that none of Olmert’s other ministers could offer. He’d been by Ben-Gurion’s side during the 1956 war, had been in Golda’s government in 1967, and was Defense Minister after the 1973 war, through Entebbe, until Begin’s defeated Labor in the 1977 election. Despite our ow

Bibi’s idea to reopen efforts to get peace with Syria didn’t last either. Although I’d learn of this only a few years later, he’d approved a visit to Damascus by the American Jewish businessman Ronald Lauder to meet President Assad. The visit made it clear to Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned

re were nearly 100 missile sites in the "prohibited" zone, giving the Egyptians control of 20 miles or more of the airspace on our side of the canal. Golda was incensed. So was Bar-Lev. But there was no way, and no will, to reopen the fighting and force Nasser to move the missiles back. The cease-fire to

le undeniably risky, seemed to me to have every chance of success. It was to abduct a number of Syrians from an officers' club on the western edge of Damascus. We would land in transport helicopters a few miles away and unload a pair of armored cars captured in 1967. But Raful's view prevailed. I could not

ve the political experience in war that none of Olmert's other ministers could offer. He'd been by Ben-Gurion's side during the 1956 war, had been in Golda's government in 1967, and was Defense Minister after the 1973 war, through Entebbe, until Begin's defeated Labor in the 1977 election. Despite our ow

Bibi's idea to reopen efforts to get peace with Syria didn't last either. Although I'd learn of this only a few years later, he'd approved a visit to Damascus by the American Jewish businessman Ronald Lauder to meet President Assad. The visit made it clear to Bibi what successive Israeli leaders had learned