Epstein Secrets

s on 'Tuesday that while he understands Netanyahu's fears about a nuclear Iran, he was "here, not in Washington," according to The Times of Israel. Herzog also criticized Netanyahu's tactics, arguing that while "there is no doubt that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows how to deliver a speech, it

rica into an unprovoked war in Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was destine to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (which he knew was not true because Mossad interrogated Saddam son-in-law who had run the program and defected to Jordan before returning back to Iraq where he was killed) to destroy Israel

rs on Tuesday that while he understands Netanyahu's fears about=a nuclear Iran, he was "here, not in Washington," according =o The Times of Israel. Herzog also criticized Net=nyahu's tactics, arguing that while "there is no doubt that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows how=to deliver a speech, it

ica into an unprovoked war in Iraq, claiming that Saddam Hussein was destine to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (which he knew wa= not true because Mossad interrogated Saddam son-in-law who had run =he program and defected to Jordan before 7 EFTA_R1_02077683 EFTA02703049 returning back to Iraq wher

What, the American asked, did he make of the fact that Egypt had moved its two main armored divisions into the Sinai, toward the border with Israel? Herzog came up with a suitably woolly reply, about how it was obviously a situation which bore watching. But the truth was that neither he nor anyone else i

r, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negotiators at Camp David, not to mention the d

What, the American asked, did he make of the fact that Egypt had moved its two main armored divisions into the Sinai, toward the border with Israel? Herzog came up with a suitably woolly reply, about how it was obviously a situation which bore watching. But the truth was that neither he nor anyone else i

r, Hafez al-Assad, a few months earlier. Yet these three dedicated men — Gili, who was by training a lawyer; Shlomo, an academic; and Danny, a former Mossad chief — had just been through dozens of hours of intricately detailed talks with each of Arafat’s top negotiators at Camp David, not to mention the d