Epstein Secrets

ourselves with the Soviet Union... We are ready to offer facilities to the Soviet fleet from Port Said to Salloum and from al-Arish to Gaza." With Nasser's death in September 1970, and the inauguration of Anwar Sadat as Egyptian President, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship quickly deteriorated. The KG

ch and to whom. The administration could change course and decide that living with Assad is better than the danger of a fragmented Syria overrun by Al Qaeda- backed jihadists. (Former CIA Director Michael Hayden endorsed that option last week, telling a Washington audience that it might be "the best ...

again dashing the hopes of pro-U.S. factions in the opposition. Meanwhile, other forces were competing for influence in the Syrian snake pit, too. Al Qaeda and its allies sponsored jihadist groups that imported aspiring terrorists from Iraq and other countries. Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Persian Gu

more hardline, Sinai-based Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the attack). The "terrorist" listing and crackdown is reminiscent of the Nasser era in the 1960s, which witnessed the execution of Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb. It has also inspired a witch-hunt in Egypt against members and su

the recent $3 billion dollar loan given to its armed forces by the Saudi Arabian government. Iraq: A significant number of jihadists with links to al-Qaida and fighters in Syria—in particular, members of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)—have moved into Fallujah and Ramadi in Anb

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

ates in Cairo, innovative ideas were in short supply as nostalgia prevailed. There was talk about the villa on Hishmet Street in Zamalek from where Nasser's Egypt supported African liberation movements and leaders. Some participants proposed reverting to older policies and instruments: refusing foreig

uded that Taj's ISI was directly involved in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and was undermining the new drone program to attack Al Qaeda targets inside Pakistan by warning the terrorists before attacks. Taj was regarded as either unable to rein in the S Department or complicit in its

s. Take your pick of scary scenarios: HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_030075 --- PAGE BREAK --- 17 civil war, a Sunni fundamentalist takeover, or a new base for al Qaeda. Of course, there would also be an upside to Assad's demise. A brutal regime would have fallen; Iran would be denied an Arab patron and a critical wi

s. The first three military coups that followed Syrian independence were engineered by Sunni officers. This was followed by the disastrous union with Nasser's Egypt in 1958 when Baath party leaders, following their pan-Arabist nationalist logic, merged their country's identity into that of their more powe