Epstein Secrets

times. In the aftermath of defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, Egypt's soldiers became the object of ridicule. The jokes got so out of hand that Gamal Abdel Nasser finally called on Egyptians to stop poking fun at the army. But Egyptians' political jokes do not come without a price: Through the years, hundreds

u can't publicly admit this policy because it would alienate his right-leaning political base. The settler lobby, which has a strong footing in the Likud Party, constantly criticizes Netanyahu for not permitting "sufficient" construction. To placate them, it appears that Netanyahu's government has b

sia in the past several months—most conspicuously, Egypt. Following his categorical and embarrassing defeat in the Six-Day War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, already a Soviet client, reaffirmed his fealty to Moscow Centre by telling Nikolai Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet:

t movement since the fall of Communism.) The overt anti-Arab racism in Yisrael Beytenu's campaign in 2008, and the fact that it has now merged with Likud, may be a national embarrassment to many Israeli liberals, but it, too, illuminates another tempting pathway for Putin's outreach to a changing Mid

ia, Israel was much more ambivalent about that outcome. The Israelis are always opposed to the rising regional force. When that was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, they focused on Nasser. When it was al Qaeda and its sympathizers, they focused on al Qaeda. When it was Iran, they focused on Tehran. But simple

ted. Rather than rising to the level of a strategic dialogue, the secularist constituency of Kadima confronted the religious constituencies of the Likud coalition and failed to create a government able to devise a platform for decisive action. This is Israel's crisis. It is not a sudden, life-threat

archy had been toppled in a coup organized by a group of army officers led by a stridently pan- Arabist — and anti-Israeli — lieutenant colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypt began providing not just tacit support for the fedayeen in Gaza, but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then,

not to do so, I decided to return to government in 2007 as Defence Minister. I remained in that role for six years: mostly in the current, right-wing Likud government of my onetime Sayeret Matkal charge, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future ch

archy had been toppled in a coup organized by a group of army officers led by a stridently pan- Arabist — and anti-Israeli — lieutenant colonel named Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egypt began providing not just tacit support for the fedayeen in Gaza, but arming and training them and helping organize cross-border attacks. Then,

not to do so, I decided to return to government in 2007 as Defence Minister. I remained in that role for six years: mostly in the current, right-wing Likud government of my onetime Sayeret Matkal charge, Bibi Netanyahu. Much of what I say in this book about war and peace, security and Israel’s future ch

ee Officers Movement. 18 June 1953 The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) abolishes the monarchy and proclaims the Republic of Egypt. 23 June 1956 Gamal Abdel Nasser is elected President of the Republic of Egypt. 26 July 1956 President Nasser of Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal. 29 October 1956 Suez Crisis. Isr

e referendum. 11-25 July 2000 Camp David II negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasir Arafat. 25 July 2000 Camp David Statement. 28 September 2000 Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, prompting major Palestinian riots. Second Palestinian uprising (al-Aqsa Intifadah) b