Epstein Secrets

was whatever further movement they might cajole out of our negotiators. Still, on day-three of Clinton’s absence, I got a note saying that Secretary Albright was on her way to my cabin. I didn’t want the needless diplomatic difficulty involved in again telling her I could not sanction free- wheeling, and d

he summit’s collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I’d phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. “Let’s hope the violence doesn’t come,” I told them. “But if it does, make sure we are ready.” Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. But all that was process. Winning or losing would come d

was whatever further movement they might cajole out of our negotiators. Still, on day-three of Clinton's absence, I got a note saying that Secretary Albright was on her way to my cabin. I didn't want the needless diplomatic difficulty involved in again telling her I could not sanction free- wheeling, and d

he summit's collapse. My main concern was the possibility of violence. Even before returning home, I'd phoned Shaul Mofaz and Avi Dichter, the former Sayeret Matkal officer who was now head of the Shin Bet. "Let's hope the violence doesn't come," I told them. "But if it does, make sure we are ready." Though there

eer by training, he was a reserve army general who, when I was chief of staff, had been in charge of the logistics branch of the military. I gave him Sayeret Matkal backup as well, in the person of Danny Yatom, my longtime friend and former sayeret deputy. *** But all that was process. Winning or losing would com

say that Arafat was not ready at this time to make the historic compromises needed for peace. But before parting with President Clinton and Secretary Albright, I’d been more forthright. It was clear, without my saying so, that the chances of our getting a peace agreement on Clinton’s watch were now pretty m

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,

say that Arafat was not ready at this time to make the historic compromises needed for peace. But before parting with President Clinton and Secretary Albright, I’d been more forthright. It was clear, without my saying so, that the chances of our getting a peace agreement on Clinton’s watch were now pretty m

awn in Private Benjamin. The main misunderstanding, however, went deeper. The assumption appeared to be that my military achievements, especially in Sayeret Matkal, were down to a mix of brute force and raw courage. Courage, of course, was a requirement: the willingness to take risks, if the rewards for success,