Epstein Secrets

nsky acolyte — had recently taken his first steps into the political limelight. After a two-year stint as Israel’s number-two diplomat in Washington, Bibi Netanyahu had become our ambassador to the United Nations. With both Arens and Shamir, I built a solid relationship, based on mutual respect, and it would dee

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders’ relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

talking about sharing control of parts of Jerusalem with the Palestinians, there was a chorus of denunciation from right- wing politicians back home. Bibi Netanyahu had largely kept out of the public eye since his resignation after the election. Now, he issued a statement accusing me of having “broken all the red

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

also ran the risk of our soldiers being abducted, or killed. Pressure was building for a major military operation. With the election drawing nearer, Bibi Netanyahu was reminding voters that he’d been against the pullout from Gaza, and saying that we should now hit Hamas hard. Both Olmert and Tzipi, along with mo

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

nsky acolyte - had recently taken his first steps into the political limelight. After a two-year stint as Israel's number-two diplomat in Washington, Bibi Netanyahu had become our ambassador to the United Nations. With both Arens and Shamir, I built a solid relationship, based on mutual respect, and it would deep

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders' relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

talking about sharing control of parts of Jerusalem with the Palestinians, there was a chorus of denunciation from right- wing politicians back home. Bibi Netanyahu had largely kept out of the public eye since his resignation after the election. Now, he issued a statement accusing me of having "broken all the red

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

also ran the risk of our soldiers being abducted, or killed. Pressure was building for a major military operation. With the election drawing nearer, Bibi Netanyahu was reminding voters that he'd been against the pullout from Gaza, and saying that we should now hit Hamas hard. Both Olmert and Tzipi, along with mo

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the