Epstein Secrets

decade later, the idea would suddenly resurface. In my first meeting, as a newly promoted Major General, with our then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Sharon turned to me and the army’s Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, and said: “Tell me. Why the hell is Arafat still alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at

lani Brigade. In December 1954, a handover mission was organized. Three men from Company A, including one of Meir’s sergeants, joined three from the Golani Brigade. But they didn’t even hold a joint exercise before setting off. There was also a lack of clarity about who was in charge. Though the Golani c

7. So during the last, decisive 10 days of the war, I would witness first-hand the tension among our top commanders in the Sinai, especially between Sharon and Gorodish, since Arik wasted few opportunities to suggest, rightly but not always helpfully, that his successor was woefully out of his depth. I w

office. “Motta just told them that there is a military option,” he said, with a wry smile. Kuti had been a Haganah officer in 1948, in charge of the Golani brigade, head of both the northern and the southern command, and had known Motta for years. “That means we now have to find one.” I had just begun b

decade later, the idea would suddenly resurface. In my first meeting, as a newly promoted Major General, with our then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, Sharon turned to me and the army’s Chief of Staff, Rafael Eitan, and said: “Tell me. Why the hell is Arafat still alive?” He looked first at Raful, then at

lani Brigade. In December 1954, a handover mission was organized. Three men from Company A, including one of Meir’s sergeants, joined three from the Golani Brigade. But they didn’t even hold a joint exercise before setting off. There was also a lack of clarity about who was in charge. Though the Golani c

67. So during the last, decisive 10 days of the war, I would witness first-hand the tension among our top commanders in the Sinai, especially between Sharon and Gorodish, since Arik wasted few opportunities to suggest, rightly but not always helpfully, that his successor was woefully out of his depth. I w

office. "Motta just told them that there is a military option," he said, with a wry smile. Kuti had been a Haganah officer in 1948, in charge of the Golani brigade, head of both the northern and the southern command, and had known Motta for years. "That means we now have to find one." I had just begun br