Epstein Secrets

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

us into a small room in the bunker reserved for use by the Defense Minister. As Foreign Minister, I was the only cabinet member with him — along with Uri Savir, Peres’s senior deputy for peace negotiations and several other Peres aides. If there had been a discussion, I would have told him that as long as he

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

us into a small room in the bunker reserved for use by the Defense Minister. As Foreign Minister, I was the only cabinet member with him - along with Uri Savir, Peres's senior deputy for peace negotiations and several other Peres aides. If there had been a discussion, I would have told him that as long as he

r 1998) 356 Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (4 September 1999) 358 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between West Bank and Gaza Strip (5 October 1999) 363 Sharon Address at Fourth Herzliya Conference (18 December 2003) 371 Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376 Disengage

est to Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres dispatched the Director General of the ministry, Uri Savir, and the head of the ministry’s legal department, Joel Singer, to Oslo. The Norwegians had, until then, seen the secret talks in Oslo and their poten