Epstein Secrets

r chief of Preventive Security in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Let us round up the usual suspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Ara

e Gaza Strip in 2007, its leaders claim that they found a letter dating back to July 13, 2003, addressed by Dahlan to then- Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz. According to Hamas, he said: "The fear now is that Yasser Arafat will merge the Legislative Council to withdraw confidence [from the Abbas cabinet

wed as a military burden rather than as an Israeli asset. After a grueling political battle that extended through 2004 and half of 2005, a resolute Sharon carried out his plan to remove Israeli settlements and military bases from Gaza in August 2005, breaking up his own Likud party over it. This poli

t Bank might permit the same sort of terrorist takeover that withdrawal had allowed in Gaza and in south Lebanon. Now that former Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz -- who had previously presented a peace plan that would result in the creation of a Palestinian state in 60 percent of the West Bank's land -- has

r chief of Preventive Security in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Let us round up the usual suspects in Arafat's death. One obviously is Sharon, who often lamented publicly that he did not eliminate Arafat when he had the chance to do so in Beirut in 1982. In early 2004, he talked about Ara

e Gaza Strip in 2007, its leaders claim that they found a letter dating back to July 13, 2003, addressed by Dahlan to then-Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz. According to Hamas, he said: "The fear now is that Yasser EFTA_R1_02209756 EFTA02723628 Arafat will merge the Legislative Council to withdraw

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

tebbe, he said that if we couldn’t be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

ons be imposed, and Shlomo agreed. The first was that the visit not occur on a Friday, when the mosques would be full of worshipers; the second, that Sharon not set foot in either of the mosques on the Haram. Our chief of police informed Sharon that if he didn’t accept the conditions, we’d deny him permis

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I’d been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011808 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as

med to agree. Notably, Yitzhak Rabin. He was no longer in government, nor even in charge of Labor. But he had always had a soft spot for Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter

tebbe, he said that if we couldn't be reasonably confident of success, we would negotiate. Now that we knew where Waschsman was being held, I ordered Shaul Mofaz, the commander with responsibility for the West Bank, to prepare for a possible rescue. Before going to brief Rabin, I arranged for another commando

ons be imposed, and Shlomo agreed. The first was that the visit not occur on a Friday, when the mosques would be full of worshipers; the second, that Sharon not set foot in either of the mosques on the Haram. Our chief of police informed Sharon that if he didn't accept the conditions, we'd deny him permis

s difficult as possible. They were also targeting our local surrogates, the Maronite-led South Lebanese Army militia. I'd been meeting regularly with Shaul Mofaz, the former paratroop officer who 337 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028185 / BARAK / 52 was now chief of staff, to ensure we had a plan to get our troops out as